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"Administration of Justice Is Archaic"-The Rise of
Modern Court Administration: Assessing Roscoe Pound's
Court Administration Prescriptions
SUE K. DOSAL,* MARY C. MCQUEEN,** AND RUSSELL R. WHEELER***
Note. This is a heavily edited and partially reorganized version of the CC/COSCA
panel on "The Rise of Modem Court Administration. " In it, Sue Dosal and Mary
McQueen assess three changes advocated by Pound in respect to the organization of
courts, based on their experiences as state court administrators in Minnesota and
Washington, and their familiarity with court administration in other states. Russell
Wheeler introduced the session, posed the questions, and was primarily responsible
for editing, annotating, and partially reorganizing the panel transcript, which Dosal
and McQueen edited as well.
INTRODUCTION: POUND AND HIS TIMES
MR. WHEELER: According to two court scholars, Roscoe Pound in his 1906
speech' "initiated the agenda of court unification., 2 In fact, though, it is likely that even
had Pound not been invited to St. Paul in late August of 1906, the propositions
associated with his address would have come to dominate the last century's court
reform movement. Pound's diagnoses and prescriptions were part of the Progressive
Era approach to governmental reorganization in general and judicial system
reorganization in particular, an approach that dominated court reorganization efforts
through much of the twentieth century.
Progressives sought to reshape United States public and private institutions that
seemed unable to cope with the waves of immigration, urbanization, and
industrialization that transformed the United States in the decades after the Civil War.
Progressives were committed to simplicity, unification, "business-like" methods, and
the use of the "efficiency experts" that Frederick W. Taylor described in 1911 in The
Principles ofScientific Management.3 The movement was hardly a monolith; different
strands were represented by Theodore Roosevelt, who sought to win back the
presidency in 1912 on the Progressive Party ticket; William Howard Taft, the
* State Court Administrator, Minnesota Judicial Branch; B.A., University of Minnesota
(1969); M.S.J.A., University of Denver College of Law (1972); J.D., William Mitchell College
of Law (1979).
** President, National Center for State Courts; J.D., Seattle University (1986).
*** President, Governance Institute; Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution; A.B.,
Augustana College; Ph.D., University of Chicago.
1. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
2. DAVID B. ROTTMAN & WILLIAM E. HEWITT, TRIAL COURT STRUCTURE AND
PERFORMANCE: A CONTEMPORARY REAPPRAIsAL 5 (1996).
3. FREDERICK WINsLOw TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (Norton
1967) (1911).
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incumbent Republican whose re-election Roosevelt helped thwart; and Democrat
Woodrow Wilson, the victor in 1912. Pound himself remained a Republican
throughout the period, although he "became attracted to the moderate progressive wing
of the Republican Party in the early 1900s. 'A As N.E.H. Hull put it, the progressivism
to Pound's "liking... was elitist, was pro-business, recognized the value of expertise,
and was supported by some members of the legal fraternity." 5 It was not the
progressivism that called for the election of judges and recall of judicial decisions,
favored by some who wanted to provide more "popular" control in order to decrease
"popular dissatisfaction" with the courts.
In the judicial area, Progressives confronted an uneven terrain of specialized state
and local courts-including juvenile courts, traffic courts, municipal courts, and small
claims courts-all testimony to the truth of Robert Tobin's observation that
"Americans have rarely been content with courts of general jurisdiction.",6 These
courts, moreover, were dependent for funding on the localities that created them and
were often the province of locally elected judges and clerks.
Progressives wanted to change all of that, and more. As we discuss below, part of
the remedy they sought was (1) consolidation of disparate local trial courts, as well as
all the appellate courts, into one single, state-wide court with divisions; (2) vesting
superintending authority over the single, state-wide court in the chiefjustice; and (3)
organizing the administrative personnel of the court under the control ofjudges, with a
mandate to gather and analyze quantitative information about how the courts perform.
Obviously, the unified judiciaries that Progressives advocated did not come to pass,
certainly not in the early twentieth century and never in the specific, one-court form
they advocated. Resistance to their proposals was intense in the early twentieth century.
Dean Wigmore's eyewitness account of the floor debate in St. Paul after Pound's 1906
address reveals the resistance with which the established bar greeted Pound's
proposals. One commentator on the floor promised to 'show the contrary of every one
of the material positions taken in the paper,"' and defended contemporary legal
procedure as "'the most refined and scientific system ever devised by the wit of man."'7
However, Progressive Movement judicial reform principles--unification, clear lines
of authority, and administrative control-were embodied in the court organization
pronouncements and standards that have represented the conventional wisdom of court
administration for much of the century. In 1909, a special ABA committee appointed in
the wake of Pound's address (a committee on which Pound served) recommended:
The whole judicial power of each state, at least for civil causes, should be
vested in one great court, of which all tribunals should be branches, departments
or divisions. The business as well as the judicial administration of this court
4. N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 62 (1997).
5. Id. at 62-63.
6. ROBERT W. TOBIN, CREATING THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: THE UNFINISHED REFORM 54
(1999).
7. John H. Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's St. Paul Address of 1906, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE
Soc'Y 176, 177 (1937) (emphasis in original).
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should be thoroughly organized so as to prevent not merely waste of judicial
power, but all needless clerical work .... 8
The ABA did not adopt this report, 9 but the American Judicature Society said the
report was where "the conception of the unified state court system first received
adequate expression."' 0 (That would seem to belie Dean Wigmore's 1936 claim that
"[f]or many ensuing years the St. Paul speech was the catechism for all progressive-
minded lawyers and judges."' 1 Similarly, Felix Frankfurter and James Landis, in their
ground-breaking study of federal jurisdiction, hailed the 1909 report for "giv[ing] the
lead to all contemporary movements for judicial reform."'1 2 They gave Pound's speech
only a brief prefatory reference.)
Progressive Movement themes continued to dominate even after the Movement
itself had faded. The ABA's first set of court organization standards, approved in 1938,
called "in each state for a unified judicial system with power and responsibility in one
of the judges to assign judges to judicial service so as to relieve congestion of dockets
and utilize the available judges to the best advantage."' 13 The ABA adopted subsequent,
similar versions, often referred to as the Vanderbilt Standards because of the advocacy
of New York Law School Dean and later New Jersey Chief Justice Arthur Vanderbilt.14
More recent versions of the ABA court organization standards still advocate "a court
system that is unified in its structure and administration," although no longer insisting
on a single court.' 5 The 1990 standards propose a "simple" structure: "a trial court and
an appellate court, each having divisions and departments as needed."' 6 Reflecting
post-Progressive Era social science,' 7 the 1990 standards place less emphasis on
8. Am. Judicature Soc'y, The State-Wide Judicature Act, 1 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 101,
101 (1917) (quoting Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate
Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, 34 A.B.A. REP. 578,589
(1909)).
9. Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate ProposedLaws to
Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, supra note 8, at 587-602.
10. Am. Judicature Soc'y, supra note 8, at 101.
11. Wigmore, supra note 7, at 178.
12. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 223
(1927). For a more extended analysis of the apparently limited impact of the 1906 address, see
Russell Wheeler, Roscoe Pound and the Evolution of Judicial Administration, 48 S. TEX. L.
REv. 943, 944-949 (2007).
13. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF JUDICIAL COUNCILS, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION 29 (Arthur T. Vanderbilt ed., 1949).
14. Vanderbilt's MINIMUM STANDARDS volume, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF JUDICIAL COUNCILS,
supra note 13, contains iterations of this court organization and other standards in the 1940s.
15. 1 JUDICIAL ADMIN. Dlv., AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION:
STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION § 1.10 (1990).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Geoff Gallas, The Conventional Wisdom of State Court Administration: A
Critical Assessment and an Alternative Approach, 2 JUST. Sys. J. 35 (1976) (criticizing the




"control" and more on participation: "All judges throughout the system should have a
voice in policymaking through their chiefjudges, committee work, and other means."'1 8
Pound and his 1906 address, though, deserve their due. Although his St. Paul
indictment was but one of the Progressive Era's call for change, it gave a particular
voice to the era's prescriptions for the judicial branch. Three propositions that Pound
offered are especially linked to the "rise of modern court administration." For those
propositions, we turn only partly to Pound's 1906 address, because it dealt only
marginally with how to organize courts and not at all on how to administer them. It was
more concerned with the purposes society expects courts to serve and the procedures
courts use.
Court organization and administration, however, were prominent in a document
Pound co-authored eight years after his 1906 address. The Preliminary Report on
Efficiency in the Administration of Justice, commissioned by the National Economic
League,' 9 was the product of five individuals. Pound, by now a professor at Harvard
Law School, was clearly the lead author, but the identities of the other four say
something about the integral relationship between court reform and political reform in
the Progressive Era. The most famous was Boston attorney and future Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis, well known for his reliance on quantitative data in his briefs
challenging workplace conditions and rate gouging by public utilities and carriers.
Charles W. Eliot had recently retired as president of Harvard University. Moorfield
Storey, a Boston attorney, had been president of the American Bar Association and
was one of the founding members of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People. Adolph Rodenbeck, an attorney of Rochester, New York, had been
involved in efforts to simplify civil procedure.2 ° (Henry Friendly credited the
Preliminary Report as the impetus for his 1928 analysis of diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction,21 but did not mention the 1906 address, even though diversity jurisdiction
was one of Pound's main targets in 1906-more evidence that the address achieved
iconic status as the "but for" cause of the modem court reform movement only well
after its delivery.)
I. COURT UNIFICATION
In 1906, Pound said that "[m]ultiplicity of courts is characteristic of archaic law.",22
He compared the situation in state courts in the United States, where much litigation
concerned whether the case had been filed in the proper forum, with the situation in
England, "[w]here the appellate tribunal and the court of first instance are branches of
one court, [and therefore] all expense of transfer of record, or transcripts, bills of
exceptions, writs of error and citations is wiped out.
23
18. 1 JUDICIALADMIN. DIv., AM. BARASS'N, supra note 15, § 1.10.
19. CHARLES W. ELIOT ET AL., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON EFFICIENCY IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, reprinted in RUSSELL R. WHEELER & HOwARD R. WHITCOMB, JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION: TEXT AND READINGS 48 (1977).
20. Id. at 47-48.
21. Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis ofDiversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483,
483 & n.2 (1928).
22. Pound, supra note 1, at 409.
23. Id. at410.
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The 1914 report elaborated on this theme and introduced the concept of specialist
judges:
Effective administration ofjustice in the urban communities of today requires a
unification of the judicial system whereby the whole judicial power of the state
shall be vested in one organization, of which all tribunals shall be branches or
departments or divisions.... Multiplication of tribunals is the first attempt of the
law to meet the demand for specialization and division of labor. Yet it is at best a
crude device. The need is for judges who are specialists in the class of causes with
which they have to deal. This need may be met by specialized courts with
specialized jurisdiction. But it may be met, also, by a unified court with specialist
judges, to whom special classes of litigation are assigned. Undoubtedly much
specialization is desirable and will be desirable increasingly in the future. But
concurrent jurisdictions, jurisdictional lines between courts, with consequent
litigation over the forum and the venue at the expense of the merits, and judges
who can do but one thing, no matter how little of that is to be done nor how much
of something else, are not the way to provide therefor. Rather there should be
specialized judges.24
Was Pound correct in his call for unified courts and specialized judges?
MS. DOSAL: I think Minnesota is the poster child for his argument for unified
courts. We have a single trial court. That's it. There are no municipal courts; there are
no other kinds of courts, only a single trial court, and an intermediate court of appeals
and a supreme court.
Over a twenty-year period, Minnesota unified and streamlined its trial courts. Our
work started during the national court reform period in the early 1970s. The spark
came in part from Warren Burger, who was originally from St. Paul. It was fueled by
federal funds from the now-defunct Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
which allowed each state to have judicial planning committees that examined court
organization and administration reform issues.
In the 1970s, we had a plethora of different kinds of lower courts. We merged them
into a single county court. And then a dozen years later we moved to merge them into
the general jurisdiction court. We've had a single court since that time.
Minnesota is one of only a handful of states that have a pure single-level trial court.
[There appear to be eight such states and jurisdictions: California (superior court),
District of Columbia (superior court), Idaho (district court with a magistrates division),
Illinois (circuit court), Iowa (district court), Minnesota (district court), Puerto Rico
(court of first instance, with "superior" and "municipal" divisions), and South Dakota
(circuit court).] 25
We in Minnesota believe our experience shows that Pound's call for unification-at
least as applied to the trial courts-has stood the test of time. There have been many
benefits from this unification. Clearly there's no confusion over where to file a case.
We have increased the flexibility in the allocation of judicial resources and the
24. ELIOT ET AL., supra note 19, at 51.
25. See National Center for State Courts, Court Statistics Project, http://www.ncsconline.
org/D_Research/CtStruct/Index.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2006) (providing charts of the court
structures of every state).
1297
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
assignment ofjudges to cases. Judge time can more easily be allocated where the need
is.
In the last ten to fifteen years, our caseload has changed dramatically. We've had an
enormous increase, perhaps sixty percent in the last decade, in serious criminal and
juvenile cases, while our civil cases have remained flat, and our minor cases have
actually declined. Unification has allowed us, in a world of scarce resources, to decide
which kind of cases are going to have priority and then to make that happen by how we
assign our judges.
We have experienced cost efficiencies in both time and travel reduction. We are a
rural state. Seventy-seven counties, roughly speaking, out of our eighty-seven counties
are rural. Before unification, judges were literally passing each other on the roads as
they went from one court to the other to hear the particular kind of case that they could
hear. And, of course, we've also seen a reduction in delay as a result of the judges
being able to hear the cases promptly.
As envisioned by Pound, Minnesota has, within the unified court, created what he
called "specialist" judges in our larger jurisdictions. Judges rotate through divisions
on two- or three-year terms. While they are not permanent, they're there long enough
to gain expertise in some of the complicated areas. It also avoids the burnout ofjudges
who are permanently assigned to particular kinds of case types. In recent years, we
have seen the rise of problem-solving courts as well, which are actually special
calendars with a kind of a specialist judge. All of this is quite easily accomplished
within a unified court.
MS. McQUEEN: I think that court organization has been the area where Pound's
impact has been greatest. Long-standing ABA resolutions, along with the Conference
of Chief Justices' 1955 encouragement for all states "to measure court administration
against the standards proposed by Chief Justice Vanderbilt, '26 have contributed, in one
way or another, to states restructuring their trial courts, based either on subject matter
jurisdiction or organization.
What Pound meant by structural unification was a system that would eliminate the
chaos and confusion about where people needed to go to file their cases. As Sue
mentioned, only a few states have adopted a single-tiered trial court, but other states
adopted-and the ABA standards provided for-a two-tiered trial court consisting of a
general jurisdiction trial court and a professionalized court of limited jurisdiction.
Whether unification comes about, how it comes about, and what kind of unification
comes about are heavily dependent on the cultural issues in the states, and, obviously,
on the politics in the states. Political culture can influence the relative appeal of either a
top-down approach with a constitutional amendment or a bottom-up approach where
the courts recognize the efficiencies of restructuring themselves. The Washington state
court system, where I served for years, is not-constitutionally-a unified system. The
trial court judges, in conjunction with the supreme court, nevertheless recognized that
in order to be an equal branch of government, in order to be able to interact effectively
with the executive and the legislative branches, they had to speak with one voice. The
statutorily created trial court associations supported a supreme court rule establishing a
judicial board of directors-the Board for Judicial Administration (BJA)-charged
with adopting positions on important legislative issues, setting priorities for court
26. TOBIN, supra note 6, at 133.
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innovation, and developing a court performance audit process. With the support of the
BJA, the supreme court adopted a rule establishing the authority of trial court presiding
judges and creating Trial Court Coordinating Councils to encourage cooperation
between the two-tiered trial courts.27 The BJA was also instrumental in the proposal
and passage of a constitutional amendment providing for the sharing of judicial
resources between the court levels.28 Thus, the Washington experience seems to belie
Pound's apparent view that only top-down superintendence would work.
David Rottman and William Hewitt of the National Center for State Courts in 1996
assessed empirically whether trial court unification affects trial court performance,
measuring performance by user satisfaction. They found-acknowledging some
definitional ambiguity about what constitutes "unification"-that the court systems in
their study that "consistently received above average satisfaction ratings ... also have
the most unified [trial] court systems., 2 9 Nevertheless, court unification per se will not
necessarily produce better performance. As Rottman and Hewitt summarized their
findings: "unification remains an essential tool for court reform, but its potential
contribution appears to be less than what can be gained from changing other aspects of
how trial courts organize their work," in particular how judges are assigned cases,
distinctions between central and chambers support staff, and the position of the chief
judge.3 °
Finally, structural unification is separate from state funding. In Washington, for
example, in the 1970s there were two attempts to adopt structural reorganization and
state funding, and both failed, partly in the face of trial judge opposition. 31 In the last
five years, however, Washington formed a special Court Funding Task Force to look at
a functional approach to state funding.32 First, what services are constitutionally
required, such as juries, indigent defense, investigation, interpreters, and judicial
salaries? The trial judges have supported state funding of those things, and supported
as well a supreme court rule on the authority of presiding judges 33 and a constitutional
amendment allowing cross-assignment ofjudges. 34 This has happened in a state that's
not formally unified.
QUESTION: I understand the concept of a unified, one-trial-level system for
specialized judges, but are the specialty courts that are arising going to eventually
erode the concept of one-level trial court? We just unified the trial courts in my state
and now we're hearing, "Oh, we need more specialized courts." Do you think that
specialty courts are actually eroding the concept of a unified trial court?
MS. DOSAL: Well, I don't, because I think it is actually consistent with Pound's
idea of generalist courts and specialized judges. What we call our drug courts, our
27. WASH. GEN. R. 29.
28. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (amended 2001).
29. ROTrMAN & HEWITT, supra note 2, at 63.
30. Id. at 5.
3 1. See generally Philip B. Winberry, Washington State Court Reform, ST. CT. J., Spring
1980, at 3 (discussing failed legislative and citizen-action attempts to achieve judicial reform in
Washington).
32. COURT FUNDING TASK FORCE, BD. FOR JUDICIAL ADMIN., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: THE
COURT FUNDING CRISIS IN WASHINGTON STATE (2004).
33. WASH. GEN. R. 29.
34. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (amended 2001).
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community courts, mental health courts, and domestic violence courts are actually
calendars, created within the unified court. We're able to move judges around as
needed, and for that reason, I don't see an inconsistency between specialized courts-
more accurately calendars-and the unified trial court.
MS. McQUEEN: An alternative view is that the more these courts are identified
with social services, it's more difficult to see them as merely calendars. Tension is
created by moving judges who don't have the experience into courts dealing with the
housing authority or with the child protective services. We're all waiting to see what
the ultimate impact is, but there's definitely that tension. In some courts with
specialized calendars, one can see almost a jealousy developing within a single general
jurisdiction trial court if it appears that ajudge with one of these specialty assignments
gets more resources or more emphasis. I agree with Sue that a good cross-
assignment system can help avoid some of the tension, but I doubt it can eliminate it.
Rottman and Hewitt found a somewhat different problem in their 1996 study. They
note that one of the most common reasons for resisting unification is "a firm belief that
it will make it more difficult to find judges with the necessary specialized legal
knowledge and temperament for certain kinds of cases," especially emotionally
draining cases, and thus they suggest a form of unification that "consciously provides
for the recruitment and assignment of judicial officers to handle specialized dockets
without controversy, but that also provides for the inclusion of these judicial officers in
the court's management decisions."
35
II. COURT ADMINISTRATION
MR. WHEELER: Another theme on which Pound elaborated in the 1914
"Preliminary Report" was superintendence of the entire court system-and keep in
mind that by "court" he was referring to the entire judicial system of a state, organized
as one unified court with divisions. He wrote:
Some one high official of the [unified] court should be charged with
supervision of the judicial business of the whole court, and he should be
responsible for failure to utilize the judicial power of the commonwealth
effectively. He should have the power to superintend the calendars of the different
branches and divisions and to make such classifications and distributions of the
business in each branch or division as experience shows to be suited to advance its
work. He should have power to make reassignments of judges or temporary
assignments to particular branches [and] ... to transfer or specially assign causes
or proceedings ... according to the condition of the calendars. He should be
responsible to the people for insuring that the whole judicial power of the
commonwealth is fully and effectively employed upon all the business of the
court.
3 6
Beneath this overall superintendent, Pound advocated divisional chiefjudges:
35. RoTrmAN & HEWITT, supra note 2, at 7.
36. ELIOT ET AL., supra note 19, at 51-52.
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[U]nder the general superintendency of this head of the court, there should be a
like judicial officer, since no clerk should be given such powers, for each branch
and division, and where there are large cities, for each locality. This officer should
have similar powers with respect to the branch ... of which he is the chief or
presiding judge, and should be responsible to the chief of the whole court for the
classification and distribution of its business and effective disposition of the
causes assigned to it. Concentration of responsibility in this way should be a
sufficient safeguard against abuse of these offices.
37
And then, in an era when elected clerks of court dominated the administration of
courts, operating from their own electoral power bases, Pound called for what today we
would call court administrators:
[T]he court should be given control of the clerical and administrative force
through a chief clerk, responsible to the court for the conduct of this part of its
work. We have hampered the administration ofjustice by the extreme to which we
have carried the decentralization of courts. In many jurisdictions the clerks are
independent officers, over whom the courts have little or no control .... Each
clerk's office [in most states] is independent of every other. It is no one's duty to
study the system, suggest improvements, or enforce them when made. What
responsibility will do in this connection, when joined to corresponding power, is
shown in the Municipal Court of Chicago, where the system of abbreviated
records is said to have effected a saving of $200,000 a year. Moreover, if courts
are to do the work demanded of the law in large cities . . . and in industrial
communities, they must develop much greater administrative efficiency, and must
be able to compete in this respect with administrative boards and commissions.
38
What has been the shelf life of these prescriptions?
MS. DOSAL: With respect to the consolidation of authority in the chiefjustice, if
taken literally to mean vesting all authority in one person, that has not stood the test of
time, in my view. However, if one takes this to mean that authority for the
administration of the state judicial branch should be centralized, I think it has stood the
test of time, not only in Minnesota, but around the country.
Pound seems to have assumed that unifying the courts under central supervision
would automatically lead to consistent procedures, improved management, and
therefore improved judicial output, and he talked about a visible chain of command.
Consolidation of authority is certainly necessary, but it's not sufficient to do what
Pound was hoping to do.
In Minnesota, a 1977 Act of the legislature made the chiefjustice the administrative
head of the judicial branch of the state. 39 The legislature gave him or her supervisory
authority over all courts within the state. That made a difference. It gave the chief
justice the authority to assign judges, to put in place a statewide information system,
create an inventory of our cases statewide, and propound other overarching goals or
aspirations such as case processing time standards. The Act also created chiefjudges at
37. Id. at 52.
38. Id.
39. Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 432, 1977 Minn. Laws 1147 (codified as amended at MINN.
STAT. §§ 2.724, 480.15, 480.17 (2005)).
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the local level, elected by their peers, as administrative heads of the courts within the
judicial district, subject to the superintending authority of the chief justice. But the
chiefjustice, even with this authority, was something of a toothless tiger, because the
majority of the funding for the trial courts that the chiefjustice was to supervise was at
the local level. Pound's advocacy of a judicial superintendent without funding
authority ignores the so-called "golden rule": "he who has the gold makes the rules."
In order to get where Pound wanted to go, in Minnesota we believed we also needed
budgetary unity within the judiciary. This included a uniform personnel system for the
state. A budget is a policy document expressed in fiscal terms, and without that ability
to control the budget, in my view, it is nearly impossible to develop consistent
statewide policy and then actually make it happen by allocating personnel and
operating resources to it.
It took us a long time to get there-fifteen years-but since last July, Minnesota has
fully state funded its trial courts as well as its appellate courts. That means we now for
the first time have the real ability to affect policy on a statewide basis.
With the shift to full state funding, we believed that a new look at the governance of
a unified branch was needed. We concluded that a total top-down approach to
governance as Pound suggested would not work for this newly unified and, much
larger organization. While it is critical to centralize statewide administrative policy
making, our solution-given the elected and independent nature of a judge-dominated
system---was to share the power of the chiefjustice as the administrative head with a
broader body. We ultimately looked to Utah and California and created a judicial
council.
The Minnesota Judicial Council is a twenty-five member body, with nineteen voting
members who are judges, fifteen of whom are from the trial court. And there are six
administrators representing the state, judicial district, and county levels. The Council is
heavily dominated by trial court representation but chaired by the chiefjustice, with the
state court administrator serving as the chief executive officer and staff to the Council.
It is now clear that administrative responsibility and accountability for the entire
system rests within that one group. The members of the Council by order of the chief
justice are charged with making decisions in the best interests of the system as a whole.
The composition has worked to ensure broad perspectives as significant policies are
considered and also "buy in" from the various levels of court as tough issues of
governance are addressed.
There is, of course, a need to balance strong central leadership with the necessary
amounts of local autonomy and discretion. Pound alluded to this in suggesting that
central administrative authority be delegated to officers in the "major branches of the
court." Within the Minnesota structure, primary powers at the state level that are vested
in the Judicial Council include the overall budget and staffing allocation, setting and
monitoring branch performance measures, the approval of a judicial branch strategic
plan, and the development of "ends" policies, which focus on outcomes to be
achieved-the "what" rather than the "how." The implementation of statewide
administrative policies is delegated to the state court administrator, and day-to-day
management and operations are left to the court units.
As to the equal importance of the administrative side, I certainly think that Pound
was correct. I may be biased, given my particular position, but I think that the rise of
the professional administrator is one of the most consequential developments for court
administration and the advancement of the administration of justice in the hundred
years since Pound's speech.
1302 [Vol. 82:1293
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We had elected clerks in Minnesota until 1971. We really needed the administrative
machinery of the judiciary to be accountable to the judicial branch, and the
constitutional amendment that authorized thejudiciary to appoint clerks made possible
the rise of professional administration in our state. We subsequently created
professional regional trial court administrators, gave them more authority, and also
clarified the authority for the state court administrator. With all of that came many of
the advancements that we all know about in terms of modem business practices:
management information systems, business practice evaluation and redesign, uniform
rules of court, solid budgeting practices, cultivating professional and personal
relationships with the staff of local and state funding bodies, professional media and
public information capabilities, and the development of research and evaluation units
that allow us to manage by data, not by anecdote.
In a broader sense, with the assistance of professional administrators, we in the
judiciary are now moving beyond just processes. Pound was talking about processes
and the scientific management concept that if you direct things correctly, efficiencies
and improvements naturally follow. Today we are moving beyond only numbers to
focus on outcomes. We see this in the rise of problem-solving courts and the
responsibility of administrators to help courts articulate the impact of courts in a way
that funders and the public can understand and support. We want to be able to answer
the questions funders ask: why should scarce government funds-what our former
Commissioner of Finance called opportunity dollars-be spent on the courts instead of
someplace else?
Answering that question has a lot to do with our ability to articulate the courts' role
in promoting public safety and assuring access to justice, and through our problem-
solving courts, making a positive difference in the lives of people who come before our
courts by interrupting that cycle of recidivism. Pound may not have envisioned this
kind of proactive, outcome-oriented focus-fearing as he did that courts were unable to
compete with administrative agencies 4°-but I think he would applaud it.
MS. McQUEEN: I think one thing that Pound did not take into consideration in
recommending vesting supervision in a single court official was the methods ofjudicial
selection across the states. We struggle with that phenomenon all the time, the problem
of supervising equals.
We've also found that even without a statute or a constitutional amendment that
establishes that authority specifically in the chiefjustice, there are still ways in which
chiefjustices can lead. One example is the state of the judiciary address, which almost
all chief justices have embraced as a forum for sharing with the other branches of
government, for seeing courts more on an equal basis. Another leadership opportunity
is mandatory judicial education-more specifically, chief justices' supporting
mandatory judicial education is a way to indicate accountability to the public for the
quality of judges.
Another component of leadership, regardless of whether the constitution vests
superintending authority in the chief justice, is the "chief executive officer / chief
operating officer" team model, in which the chiefjustice and state court administrator
40. See Pound, supra note 1, at 396 ("Courts are distrusted, and executive boards and
commissions with summary and plenary powers, freed, so far as constitutions will permit, from
judicial review, have become the fashion.").
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form a team that is more powerful than the sum of its parts. Judicial impact statements
afford another leadership opportunity. We have the ability to develop and gather
management information or data; we can now use those data for analysis in order to
warn about the impacts, the unintended impacts, on the courts of legislative policy.
We also need to consider the power of research. Justice Brennan, speaking in 1958
to the American Bar Association's Section of Judicial Administration, recalled Pound's
observation that local communities, and their lawyers, resist reform. "'Grave obstacles
stand in the way of improvement,"' said Pound in 1926.41
The present system works well enough in the average rural community, and
legislators from those communities see no need of change. The instinct of the
lawyer to scrutinize with suspicion all projects to reform has always retarded the
progress. Imperfection of our legislative methods ... will hold back statutory
improvements.... Popular suspicion of lawyers... will impede the adoption of
durable methods.42
But then, as Justice Brennan noted, Pound went on to say that the one thing that can
overcome all these obstacles is sound empirical research. "[T]hese obstacles will
hinder little, in the end, if our projects of reform have a sound basis in thorough,
impartial, scientific research., 43 The National Center for State Courts, I should add, has
contributed to that body of evaluative and empirical research.
4 4
Finally, I too believe that the rise in judicial administration as a profession has been
one of the major changes since the Pound speech, encouraging court executive
development programs and leadership opportunities for chief justices. Chief justices
very much more see their role as the leader and the spokesperson for that equal branch
of government, and have embraced the responsibility of the court to govern itself.
States may not be unified through a constitutional amendment, but they can achieve
some of the same results that unification offers through such devices as supreme court
rules or other administrative actions establishing performance audit standards,
developing statewide automated information systems, human resource directors, public
information officers, performance audits, and evaluation units.
Unification may be what I might call the Poundian standard, and it is a worthy goal,
but not reaching it shouldn't be an excuse for not trying to look at other alternative
opportunities to strengthen the judicial branch.
In the final analysis, as Sue said, assessing outcomes rather than simply counting the
number of filings and terminations is perhaps the major contribution of what our panel
title calls the "rise of modem court administration." It has very much changed the
41. William J. Brennan, Jr., Improving the Administration of Justice Today, in HANDBOOK
FOR JUDGES 135, 138 (Donald K. Carroll ed., 1961). Although Justice Brennan quoted Pound
without citation, the cited passage is found in Roscoe Pound, The Crisis in American Law, 10 J.
AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 5, 10 (1926).
42. Pound, supra note 41, at 10.
43. Id. at 26.
44. See, e.g., THOMAS CHURCH, JR., ALAN CARLSON, Jo-LYNNE LEE & TERESA TAN, JUSTICE
DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978); ROTrMAN & HEwIrr, supra
note 2; National Center for State Courts, Court Statistics Project, http://www.ncsconline.org/
D_Research/csp/CSPMainPage.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2006 ) (providing an overview of
the Center's multi-faceted research on the work of the nation's state courts).
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complexion of the courts, and I think that's something that Pound did not anticipate in
any way.
Bob Tobin, whom some of you know, was one of the early research consultants at
the National Center. He stated it this way: You have to centralize in order to
decentralize rationally.
45
45. See TOBIN, supra note 6, ch. 7 (discussing "The Unification Movement and the Advent
of Judicial Administration").

